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ABSTRACT
Openness to trade is one factor that has been identified as determining whether a country is prone
to sudden stops in capital inflow, currency crashes, or severe recessions. Some believe that openness
raises vulnerability to foreign shocks, while others believe that it makes adjustment to crises less
painful. Several authors have offered empirical evidence that having a large tradable sector reduces
the contraction necessary to adjust to a given cut-off in funding. This would help explain lower
vulnerability to crises in Asia than in Latin America. Such studies may, however, be subject to the
problem that trade is endogenous. We use the gravity instrument for trade openness, which is
constructed from geographical determinants of bilateral trade. We find that openness indeed makes
countries less vulnerable, both to severe sudden stops and currency crashes, and that the relationship
is even stronger when correcting for the endogeneity of trade.
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A “sudden stop” -- and abrupt cut-off in capital inflows -- entails a resource transfer 
to creditor countries, from the debtor country. Often it also entails a financial or currency 
crisis in the latter, accompanied by a sharp fall in output.
3 Broadly speaking, there are two 
opposing views on the relationship between a country’s openness and whether it is prone to 
sudden stops. The first view is that openness makes a country more vulnerable to sudden 
stops. A country highly integrated into world markets is more exposed to shocks coming 
from abroad. The second view is that countries that are open to international trade are less 
vulnerable to sudden stops. If the ratio of trade to GDP is structurally high, it is easier to 
adjust to a cut-off in international financing of a given magnitude. This paper tests the 
relationship  between  trade  openness  and  vulnerability  to  sudden  stops  to  help  choose 
between the two hypotheses. Such tests have been done before, but without fully taking 
into account the possible endogeneity of trade. Our incremental contribution here is to use 
the gravity instrument for trade openness -- which aggregates geographically-determined 
bilateral trade across a country’s partners -- to correct for the possible endogeneity of trade. 
The  view  that  openness  makes  countries  more  vulnerable  to  crises  comes  in  a 
number  of  forms.  The  claim  is  particularly  salient  if  we  are  talking  about  openness  to 
capital flows: “you can’t have an international debt crisis if you don’t have international 
debt.
4 But the claim is also made with respect to openness to trade. One variant is that a 
weakening in a country’s export markets is sometimes the trigger for a sudden stop in 
capital flows, so that a high-trade country is more vulnerable. Another variant notes that 
sudden stops in finance often extend to a loss in trade credit -- especially for imports, but 
sometimes also even for exports -- and that the resulting shrinkage in trade is more painful 
if trade was a larger share of the economy. A third variant says that openness to trade in 
practice goes hand in hand with openness to financial flows, for example because much 
trade needs multinational corporations, who in turn need to be able to move money across 
                                                 
3 To the best of our knowledge, the expression “Sudden Stops” was first used by Dornbusch, Goldfajn and 
Valdes (1995) and has since become increasingly popular. The first analytic approach to the problem of 
sudden stops is Calvo (1998).  
4 Even here, the evidence is mixed.  A good entry point to the large literature on financial liberalization and 
economic performance is Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose (2003).   2 
national borders; or because it is harder to enforce capital controls if trade is free.
5 In the 
limiting case, a country that is in autarky with respect to trade must have a net capital 
account  of  zero  due  to  the  balance  of  payments  adding  up  constraint.  Regardless  the 
specific  reasoning,  the  notion  that  globalization  leads  to  crises  is  a  generalization  that 
appeals to many. 
The view that openness to trade makes countries less vulnerable also comes with a 
number of different specific mechanisms that have been proposed. Rose (2002) argues that 
the threatened penalty of lost trade is precisely the answer to the riddle “why do countries 
so seldom default on their international debts?” and offers empirical evidence that strong 
trade links are correlated with low default probabilities. International investors will be less 
likely to pull out of a country with a high trade/GDP ratio, because they know the country 
is less likely to default. A higher ratio of trade is a form of “giving hostages” that makes a 
cut off of lending less likely.
6  
Another variant of the argument that openness reduces vulnerability takes as the 
relevant penalty in a crisis the domestic cost of adjustment, i.e., the difficulty of eliminating 
a newly-unfinanceable trade deficit. The argument goes back at least to Sachs (1985).  He 
suggested that Asian countries had been less vulnerable to debt crises than Latin American 
countries -- despite similar debt/GDP ratios -- because they had higher export/GDP ratios. 
The  relatively  worse  performance  observed  in  Latin  America  was  due  to  the  lower 
availability of export revenue to service debt. He concludes that: “After a decade of rapid 
foreign borrowing, too many of Latin America’s resources were in the nonexporting sector, 
or abroad. When financial squeeze in the early 1980’s caused banks to draw their loans, 
the only way that Latin countries could maintain debt servicing was through a recession 
and a large reduction in imports combined with debt rescheduling” (p.548). More recently, 
Guidotti et. al. (2004) make a similar point by providing evidence that economies that trade 
more recover fairly quickly from the output contraction that usually comes with the sudden 
stop, while countries that are more closed suffer sharper output contraction and a slower 
recovery.  
                                                 
5 Aizenman (2003), and Aizenman and Noy (2004). 
6 The point was originally made by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). They argue that countries that trade more are 
subject to more harmful trade-related retaliation in the aftermath of default and therefore are less likely to 
default.   3 
Consider first a country that faces a given cut-off in financing, and must adjust 
without nominal or real exchange rate flexibility. The adjustment must then come through a 
reduction  in  spending.  To  achieve  a  $1  billion  improvement  in  the  trade  balance,  the 
contraction has to be $ (1/m) billion, where m is defined as the marginal propensity to 
import (in a Keynesian model) or the share of spending that falls on tradable goods (in a 
tradable/nontradable model). The lower is m, the more painful the adjustment. Whether 
output itself falls depends, of course, primarily on whether wages and prices are flexible. 
But even in a full-employment world, sharp reductions in consumption are painful. 
Consider, second, a country that does have the option of nominal and real exchange 
rate flexibility. In traditional textbook models, if the adjustment is achieved in part through 
nominal and real depreciation, rather than exclusively through expenditure-reduction, the 
country  can  accommodate  the  tougher  new  financing  constraint  without  necessarily 
suffering  a  recession.  This  is  true  even  if  a  relatively  large  devaluation  is  required  to 
generate the necessary improvement in the trade balance. But since the emerging market 
crises of 1994-1998, economists have increasingly emphasized contractionary effects of 
devaluation, particularly via the balance sheet effect: if the country’s debts are denominated 
in foreign currency, the balance sheets of the indebted banks and corporations are hit in 
proportion to the devaluation.
7  If the economy is starting from a high ratio of trade to GDP 
the necessary devaluation need not be large, and therefore the adverse balance sheet effect 
need not be large. But if the economy is not very open to trade to begin with, the necessary 
devaluation, and the resulting balance sheet impact and recession, will all be large. Again 
we arrive at the  result that whether the necessary  adjustment will be large and painful 
depends inversely on openness. 
The balance sheet version of the openness story  is modeled formally  by Calvo, 
Izquierdo,  and  Talvi  (2003)  and  Cavallo  (2004).  Both  have  in  mind  the  example  of 
Argentina, which has traditionally had a low ratio of trade to GDP, and has suffered some 
                                                 
7  The  analytical  literature  on  balance  sheet  effects  and  output  contraction  includes:  Kiyotaki  and  Moore 
(1997),  Krugman  (1999),  Aghion,  Banerjee  and  Bacchetta  (2000),  Cespedes,  Chang  and  Velasco  (2000, 
2003), Chang and Velasco (1999), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002), Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2002), 
Dornbusch  (2001),  and  Mendoza  (2002).  Cavallo,  Kisselev,  Perri  and  Roubini  (2002)  provide  empirical 
evidence of the output cost associated to the balance sheet effect. Looking at the experience of the 1990´s they 
show that countries entering a crisis with high levels of foreign debt tend to experience large real exchange 
rate overshooting (devaluation in addition to the long run equilibrium level) and large output contractions.   4 
of the worst sudden stops.
8  But the hypothesis that openness to trade reduces a country’s 
vulnerability to sudden  stops transcends any one formal model,  causal  link, or country 
example. The same is true of the hypothesis that openness raises a country’s vulnerability.  
This paper seeks to choose empirically between the two competing hypotheses. 
What do we mean by “vulnerability to sudden stops?”  Our primary criterion will be 
a probit model measuring the probability of a sudden reduction in the magnitude of net 
capital inflows, following closely the definition of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003). But 
we  also  consider  some  other  possible  definitions.  We  look  at  the  definition  of  crisis 
episodes in Frankel and Rose (1996) and Frankel and Wei (2004), which is based on the 
exchange market pressure variable defined as the percentage depreciation plus percentage 
loss in foreign exchange reserves. In addition to looking at the probability of a sudden stop 
or currency  crisis, we also examine the subsequent output loss and its magnitude. One 
possibility is that in a country where sudden stops are associated with large recessions, they 
are more likely to occur, because investors fear that the country will default to avoid the 
recessions  --  Cavallo  (2004).
9  The  opposite  relationship  between  the  magnitude  and 
probability of crises is also possible, however.  Dooley  (2000) has suggested that when 
crises lead to recessions, countries are more likely to take care to avoid them, and so sudden 
stops are less likely. 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003) and Edwards (2004) are among the empirical 
papers that find that openness to trade is associated with fewer sudden stops. On the other 
hand, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998, 2000) find that openness helps trigger crises and/or 
                                                                                                                                                     
Similarly, Guidotti, Sturzenneger and Villar (2003) find evidence that liability dollarization worsen output 
recovery after a sudden stop in capital inflows. 
8  Others who have argued that Argentina’s low trade/GDP ratio helps explain why it was such a victim of the 
global sudden stop after 1999 include Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2003), Calvo and Talvi (2004), Desai and 
Mitra (2004) and Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, who once said it was unsurprising the Argentines had lost 
the confidence of investors because they don’t export anything. 
9  Cavallo’s  model  shows  first  that  under  a  plausible  set  of  assumptions  applicable  to  emerging  market 
economies, closedness is costly in terms of output loss in the aftermath of sudden stops. The reason is that 
these shocks trigger real exchange rate depreciations and these, in turn, are contractionary in economies that 
are highly dollarized. The size of the contraction (or, analogously, the “cost of the adjustment”) is negatively 
related to the degree of trade openness.  It also shows that foreign investors who foresee this are more likely 
to pull their money out of these countries, making sudden stops more likely.   5 
sharp  reversals  of  the  current  account.
10  All  these  papers  --  except  the  first  --  use  the 
trade/GDP ratio as the measure for openness to trade.
11  
A critic might argue that the trade/GDP ratio is endogenous. One way in which 
trade openness could be endogenous is via income: richer countries tend to liberalize trade 
barriers -- in part because their mode of public finance shifts from tariff revenue to income 
or VAT taxes.  A second way is that trade liberalization could be part of a more general 
reform strategy driven by pro-globalization philosophy or “Washington Consensus” forces. 
Other aspects of such a reform program, such as privatization, financial liberalization, or 
macroeconomic  stabilization  might  affect  the  probability  of  crises,  and  yet  an  OLS 
regression analysis might inappropriately attribute the effect to trade. A third way that trade 
openness could be endogenous is that experience with crises -- the dependent variable -- 
may itself cause liberalization, via an IMF program. Or it might have the opposite effect, if 
a country’s response to a crash is disenchantment with globalization and the Washington 
Consensus.  
A  fourth  way  in  which  trade  openness  could  be  endogenous  is  through  the 
feedbacks between trade and financial openness. Aizenman (2003) shows in the setting of a 
simple model how more commercial openness  increases the effective  cost of enforcing 
financial repression, rendering financial openness a by-product of greater trade integration. 
Similarly, one could potentially think of a reverse causality process, whereby for example, 
greater financial openness may reduce the cost of trade credit and encourage FDI, and both 
adjustments may facilitate more commercial trade. Aizenman and Noy (2004) empirically 
investigate the presence of two-way feedbacks between financial and trade integration. 
How can the endogeneity of trade be addressed?
12   We use gravity estimates to 
construct an instrumental variable for trade openness. This methodology was developed by 
Frankel and Romer (1999) in the context of the effect of trade on growth, and was later 
applied to a variety of settings in which trade and some other variable could potentially be 
                                                 
10 Along with current account balance, terms of trade, world interest rates and other variables.  Easterly, Islam 
and Stiglitz (2001) find that trade openness raises output volatility.    
11 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003) use a different measure of openness, which they claim to be superior to 
the trade to GDP ratio because it is not subject to direct valuation effects that occur as a result of changes in 
the real exchange rate. They use w = (Y*-S)/A*, where Y* is the supply of tradable goods, S are factor 
payments and A* is the absorption of tradable goods.    6 
jointly determined.
13 Basically, it consists of aggregating up across a country’s partners the 
prediction of a gravity equation that explains trade with distance, population, language, 
land-border, land-area, and landlocked status. Gravity estimates are a good instrumental 
variable, because they are based on geographical variables which are plausibly exogenous 
and yet when aggregated across all bilateral trading partners are highly correlated with a 
country’s overall trade.   
In this paper we use capital account (also known as financial account) and current 
account data for all countries in the world with data available from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), to identify sudden stops in capital flows statistically.  The data set 
covers 141 countries in total, for the period 1970-2002.  Following Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Mejia (2003), we define a sudden stop episode as taking place in a country during the year 
in which there is a noticeable reduction in the current account deficit that is driven by a 
disruptive, i.e. recessionary, reduction in foreign capital inflows.
14 As an alternative, we 
also use the Frankel and Rose (1996) definition of crisis episodes.  For the instrumental 
variable, we use the Frankel and Rose (2002) dataset to compute gravity estimates for each 
country in the sample.  These are the key variables needed to test the relationship between 
trade openness and crises.   
Using a stacked cross-section, instrumental variables techniques and controls for 
other plausible determinants of sudden stops,  we show that  (lack of) trade openness is 
indeed  a  powerful  predictor  of  these  capital  account  shocks:  moving  from  Argentina’s 
current  trade  share  (approximately  20%  of  GDP)  to  Australia’s  average  trade  share 
(approximately 30% of GDP), reduces the probability of a sudden stop by 32%. Some may 
find this result counterintuitive: trade protectionism does not “shield” countries from the 
volatility of world markets as proponents might hope. On the contrary, less trade openness 
leads to greater vulnerability to sudden stops. Finally, using a measure of composite output 
loss from Frankel and Wei (2004), and instrumental variables techniques, we find evidence 
                                                                                                                                                     
12 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003) try to deal with the problem of endogeneity of trade by computing a 
two-step hierarchical bootstrapped confidence intervals for all variables in the model. 
13 For example, Frankel and Rose (2002) shows that currency unions may raise output, via trade.  For a survey 
of the gravity model in general, and applications and extensions, see chapters 4 and 6 of Frankel (1997). 
14 A reduction in the financial account surplus could potentially be the optimal response to a positive trade 
shock. To rule out such a case as a crisis episode,  we require that a  sudden  stop be accompanied by a 
recession. As a matter of fact, this assumption is not essential for the results and we later show that all the 
findings are robust to alternative definitions of sudden stops.    7 
that openness reduces the output cost associated with the crises that occur, although this 
result is not as strongly robust as the others.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we elaborate on the empirical 
strategy and discuss the estimation method. Next, we present standard probit results using 
sudden  stop  episodes  as  the  dependent  variable  and  confirm  the  negative  correlation 
between trade openness and the probability of sudden stops that has already been noted in 
the literature. We then present instrumental variable probit results to show that the direction 
of causality goes from trade openness to reduced vulnerability to sudden stops. We then 
repeat the exercise using the Frankel and Rose (1996) definition of crisis episodes and 
confirm the previous results. Next, we perform several robustness checks, including using a 
composite  output  loss  variable  as  the  dependent  variable  in  the  regressions  to  test  the 
relationship between openness and the cost of crisis that take place. Finally we discuss 
results and conclude. 
 
II. Empirical Strategy 
We begin by testing whether countries that trade more are (all else equal) more or 
less prone to sudden stops in capital flows.  We estimate variants of the following equation: 
SSi,t = c + ￿(Trade Openness)i,t + ￿(Foreign Debt/GDP)i,t-1 + ￿(Liability Dollarization)i,t-1 + 
￿(CA/GDP) i,t-1 + ￿Z + µi,t                                                                                                                            (1) 
where  
·  “SSi,t” takes value 1 if a sudden stop hits country “i” at year “t” and 0 otherwise,  
·  “CA/GDP” is the current account balance to GDP, and  
·  “Z”  is  a  set  of  lagged  and  contemporaneous  regressors  included  for  robustness 
check purposes. 
Let us begin with the dependent variable. In order to construct SSi,t, we follow the 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003) criteria for a sudden cut in foreign capital inflows (i.e. 
worsening of the financial account surplus, FA) that is not the consequence of a positive 
shock (namely a trade shock).  Using a dataset containing annual observations for all the 
countries  in  the  world  with  available  data  in  the  IMF  International  Financial  Statistics 
database (IFS) for the period 1970-2002, we compute sudden stop episodes as a reduction 
in the CA deficit during the same year as a reduction in FA surplus. To guarantee that this   8 
reduction  in  the  CA  deficit  is  not  the  result  of  a  boom  –  rising  exports  imports  and 
income—the episode has to be disruptive, i.e., accompanied by a simultaneous reduction in 
real output. In words, a sudden stop occurs during the year in which there is a noticeable 
reduction in the current account deficit that is accompanied by a recessionary reduction in 
foreign  capital  inflows.
15  Based  on  alternative  definitions  of  what  is  “noticeable”  and 
“disruptive”  we  compute  four  classifications  of  sudden  stops  to  be  used  as  robustness 
checks for the results.    
The  preferred  definition  is  SS1.  This  algorithm  classifies  as  a  sudden  stop  a 
situation in which at a year “t”, the financial account surplus of country “i” (prevailing at 
year  “t-1”)  falls  at  least  two  standard  deviations  below  the  sample  mean;  the  current 
account deficit falls by any amount either in “t” or in “t+1”; and GDP per capita falls by 
any amount either in “t” or in “t+1.”  The overall global pattern of sudden stops under this 
criterion is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The total number of episodes captured using this methodology is 86, which is 2.4 
percent of total available country/year observations in the dataset.
16 As Figure 1 shows, 
these events take place around well-known crises periods: the early 1980’s debt crises in 
Latin America; the 1992-1993 European Monetary System crises; the 1997-1998 Asian 
crises; and the new wave of crises in developing countries in the late 1990’s and early 
2000. As shown in the last six columns of the summary statistics table in Appendix A.4, 
16% of all sudden stops occurred in the Asia-Pacific region; 13% in Europe; 33% in Latin 
America; 15% in the Middle East; 21% in Africa; and 1% in South Asia and North America 
respectively. Alternative definitions show similar patterns of temporal/spatial distribution.
17 
On the regressors side, trade openness is typically measured as a country’s ratio of 
total trade to GDP -- (X + M / Y). All these data are readily available from the IFS and the 
World Development Indicators CD-ROM (WDI) for almost all countries. But, as argued in 
the Introduction, the problem of using this measure of trade openness is that it might be 
                                                 
15 Technical details are left to the data appendix.  
16 The complete list of crisis episodes per country is in Table A.1. in Appendix A.1. 
17 Graphs are available upon request.   9 
correlated with other unobserved country characteristics, creating identification problems 
and potentially biased estimators. The contribution we seek to make to the literature is to 
avoid these problems by using instrumental variables regression techniques. We instrument 
trade openness by the predicted ratio of trade to GDP based on gravity equations. In its 
most basic form, the gravity equation captures the intuitive notion that bilateral trade flows 
are proportional to the product of each country GDP level, and inversely related to the 
distance between them. Therefore, the “predicted” trade to GDP ratio can be computed 
from data on countries’ geographic characteristics, bilateral trade flows, and GDP.  The 
gravity model has become popular, and there are some very extensive databases that can be 
used for these computations.  We used the dataset at Andrew Rose’s webpage,
18 which is 
perhaps the most complete one available and has been widely used for empirical research.
19  
Details on the methodology are left to the appendix. The important point is that, to the 
extent that the “predicted” trade to GDP ratio is highly correlated with the actual trade to 
GDP ratio
20, it is a good instrument, because it is less likely that geography is related to 
economic outcomes through any channel other than trade. In other words, geography is 
quite plausibly exogenous. A limitation imposed by this methodology is that it does not 
allow for enough variation in the instrument over time so as to estimate a model with 
country fixed effects. We don’t consider this to be a serious limitation, because most of the 
variation in trade openness is across countries, not over time.  
“Liability Dollarization” introduces the “balance sheet” effects into the empirical 
model.  According  to  the  emerging  markets  crises  literature  cited  before,  the  mismatch 
between  the  currency  denomination  of  assets  and  liabilities  in  the  private  and  public 
balance sheets of these countries increases the output costs of external shocks that trigger 
real exchange rate depreciations. Indeed, some sort of “balance sheet” mismatch is required 
to explain why real depreciations are contractionary in some countries, because in a world 
                                                 
18 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm 
19 The data set consists of 41,678 bilateral trade observations spanning six different years (1970, 1975, 1980, 
1985, 1990, and 1995). All 186 countries, dependencies, territories, overseas departments, colonies, and so 
forth for which the United Nations Statistical Office collects international trade data are included in the data 
set. The trade data are taken from the World Trade Database, a consistent recompilation of the U.N. trade data 
presented  in  Feenstra,  Lipsey,  and  Bowen  (1997),  augmented  with  data  from  U.N.’s  International  Trade 
Statistics Yearbook. This data set is estimated to cover at least 98% of all trade. 
20 The actual correlation between the variable “trade openness” and the instrument used in this paper is 0.52.   10 
without  these  imperfections  real  depreciations  should  be  expansionary.
21  We  use  two 
alternative measures of “liability dollarization”: (i) One is the ratio of foreign liabilities of 
the financial sector to money (IFS line 26C/Line 34).  This is not a direct measure of the 
extent  to  which  a  country’s  balance  sheets  present  a  mismatch  in  the  currency 
denomination  of  assets  and  liabilities.  Nevertheless  this  variable  has  been  used  in  the 
literature
22 as a proxy, primarily because it is available for almost all countries since 1970 
and because it should be correlated to actual balance sheet mismatches. (ii) Our alternative 
proxy is a measure of deposit dollarization from Arteta (2002) and Arteta (2003). This is 
“Dollar Deposits / Total Deposits” in the financial system. Intuitively, countries with a high 
percentage of deposit dollarization, but whose domestic currency is not the U.S. dollar, are 
(most  likely)  countries  whose  public  and  private  sectors  tend  to  borrow  heavily  in  a 
currency different from their own. In Arteta’s database, data on the aggregate volume of 
foreign-currency-denominated  (“dollar”)  deposits  of  residents  are  available  for  92 
developing and transition economies. The time span varies across countries, with some 
having data from as early as 1975 and some having data only from about 1995 onwards.  
“Foreign Debt /GDP” is included to control  for the level of financial openness. 
Without  debt  to  service,  there  are  no  sudden  stops  to  worry  about.  Data  for  “Foreign 
Debt/GDP” comes from IFS, where foreign debt is line 89a in that database. 
“CA/GDP”  is  “Current  Account  Balance/GDP.”    Its  presence  controls  for  the 
“quantity” of the resource transfer required in the aftermath of a sudden stop in inflows. 
Data on country’s current account balances comes from the WDI CD-ROM. 
Finally,  “Z”  is  a  set  of  (lagged  and  contemporaneous)  regressors  included  for 
robustness check purposes. These are:  
·  “the log of Reserves in months of imports” (because reserves could potentially be used 
as self-insurance against sudden stops),  
·  “the log of GDP per capita” (to control for the stage of economic development),  
·  “FDI  / GDP” (the stability of FDI flows could reduce the likelihood of a sudden stop),  
·  “institutional quality” (to avoid that “trade openness,” whether or not instrumented, is 
incorrectly appropriating effects on sudden stops that really go through institutions), 
                                                 
21 See Cespedes et. al. (2003) for a thorough discussion. 
22 E.g., Alesina and Wagner (2003) and Guidotti et. al. (2003).   11 
·  “The ratio of short term debt to total debt” (to control for the effect of the term structure 
of the debt in the likelihood of a crisis), and  
·  “ierr”, a measure for nominal exchange rate rigidity that is included to test whether 
monetary policy affects the probability of sudden stops.  
All  these  variables  come  from  WDI  CD-ROM,  with  the  exception  of  the 
“institutional quality” data, which come from Kaufmann et. al. (2002) and Marshall and 
Jaggers (2002)’s Polity IV Project, and data on “ierr,” which come from Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003) and are based on their “de-facto” exchange rate classification. 
We first present results without instrumental variables, to confirm the existence of a 
negative correlation between sudden stops and trade openness. Our specification is Probit.  
Then, we present the results based on instrumental variables for Probit (iv probit). We 
refrain  from  reporting  panel  data  (country)  fixed-effects  results  because,  as  already 
discussed, most important source of variation is across  countries, not within. Summary 
statistics for all the variables are found in the Appendix A.3, and for all variables tabulated 
by SS1 in Appendix A.4. 
We then run similar regressions where the dependent variable is currency crises, 
from the Frankel-Rose (1996) and Frankel-Wei (2004) definition, instead of the sudden 
stop measure.
23  They define crisis episodes based on the foreign market pressure index. 
This  index  is  defined  as  the  percentage  fall  in  reserves  plus  the  percentage  fall  in  the 
foreign exchange value of the currency. The idea is that this index measures the fall in 
demand for the country’s currency; it is then up to the monetary authorities to determine 
whether  to  accommodate,  by  letting  the  money  supply  fall,  or  to  depreciate.  To  avoid 
treating every year of a multi-year high-inflation period as a separate crisis, the approach 
followed by the authors requires that the increase in exchange market pressure represent an 
acceleration of at least an additional 10 percent over the preceding period to be considered 
a crisis episode; and they also adopt an exclusion window of 3 years. The total number of 
episodes captured using this methodology is 419 which is 13 percent of total available 
country/year observations in the dataset. This means that the alternative way of computing 
crisis episodes is much more comprehensive than the sudden stop criterion. The overall 
global pattern of crises events under this criterion is summarized in Figure 2. As can be 
                                                 
23 Summary statistics are in Appendix A.3   12 
readily  observed  in  Figure  2,  the  peak  in  the  number  of  episodes  captured  using  this 
methodology is also centered around well-known crisis periods.
24  
  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
III. Results 
We begin by estimating non-instrumental variables variants of equation (1), using a 
stacked cross-section.  We compute standard errors robust to clustered heteroskedasticity. 
All independent variables -- other than trade openness and effectiveness of government-- 
are lagged one period.
25  Results include year fixed effects and regional dummies, but these 
coefficients are not reported here.
26   The results reported here are based on “SS1,” but all 
estimates are robust to the use of alternative definitions of sudden stops.
27  We do not 
exclude  contiguous  crisis  episodes,  but  all  the  results  reported  here  are  robust  to  the 
inclusion of a one-year, two-sided omission window around crisis episodes.  
The explanatory power of the regressions is not high. This is not surprising; it is 
consistent with the performance of standard models of crises and the usual inability of 
leading-indicator exercises to properly predict events.
28  Table 1 summarizes the results for 
some variants of (1) using non-instrumental variables Probit specification.  
As a measure of institutional quality we report the coefficient on “effectiveness of 
government” which is one of the six proxies of institutional quality in Kaufman et. al. 
(2002).
29  The institutional quality data in Kaufman et. al. (2002) are not in panel form, so 
every  country  in  the  sample  is  assigned  a  single  (time-invariant)  value.  As  additional 
robustness checks, we also use Marshall and Jaggers (2002)’s Polity IV Project data, which 
                                                 
24 For further details on the methodology and additional summary statistics, please refer to Frankel and Wei 
(2004) 
25 Introducing contemporaneous rather than lagged variables does not affect the results. 
26 Further details on the results and robustness checks are available upon request.  
27 We use three alternative definitions. The details are in the data appendix. 
28 See, for example, Arteta (2003) 
29 All the results reported here are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the inclusion of any of the other 
five proxies proposed in that paper.  These are: “Voice and Accountability”, “Control of Corruption”, “Rule 
of Law”, “Political Stability/Lack of Violence”, and “Regulatory Framework”.     13 
is panel (country/year).
30  Using this alternative measure does not change the results, so we 
don’t report them.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 1 confirms the existence of a negative correlation between trade openness and 
the likelihood of a sudden stop, as previously documented in Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia 
(2003) and Edwards (2004). Nevertheless, the methodology employed in these papers can 
not guarantee the exogeneity of trade openness and therefore, falls short of establishing 
causality.  
As for the other regressors, interestingly, the coefficient on “Foreign Debt / GDP” 
does not appear statistically significant across most of the variants in Tables 1 or 2.
31  The 
last column in Table 1 shows that the result for trade openness is robust to the exclusion of 
the debtvariable from the regression. This is consistent with the hypothesis that different 
countries are able to tolerate different levels of debts.
 32  
Similarly,  the  coefficient  that  seeks  to  capture  the  “balance  sheet”  effects  -- 
Liability Dollarization -- is positive but not always statistically significant when definition 
(i)  is  used  and  always  insignificant  when  Arteta’s  dollarization  definition  (ii)  is  used 
instead.
33  This  result  suggests  that  these  measures  of  dollarization  appear  not  to  have 
significant detrimental effects in terms of increased vulnerability to sudden stops. Column 4 
                                                 
30 It provides a measure of the political regime’s characteristics [either democracy (high values) or autocracy 
(low values)] rather that institutional quality per se. In particular: POLITY2 (numeric). Range = -10 to 10 (-
10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy). Combined Polity Score: Computed by subtracting AUTOC from 
DEMOC; normal range polity scores are imputed for coded “interregnum" and "transition period" special 
polity conditions, polities coded “interruption" on the POLITY variable are left blank. 
31 Similarly, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia. (2003) don’t find a significant effect of total public debt in their 
probit regressions for sudden stops, nor do Frankel and Rose (1996) in their probit regressions of currency 
crashes.  
32 We also tried “Foreign Debt/Exports” in lieu of “Foreign Debt/GDP.”  In theory, the insignificance of ￿ 
could be due to the fact that both “Foreign Debt” and “GDP” are measured in domestic currency, but the 
former  potentially  has  a  larger  component  of  foreign  currency,  so  “Foreign  Debt/GDP”  could  be 
underestimating  financial  openness  before  a  sudden  stop  (if  the  real  exchange  rate  was  overvalued)  and 
simultaneously overestimating financial openness after sudden stop (if the real exchange rate overshoots ex-
post).  Nevertheless,  the  results  using  “Foreign  Debt/Exports”  do  not  change  from  those  reported  using 
“Foreign Debt/GDP.”   [Unfortunately, series for exports in domestic currency are not as widely available as 
series for GDP, so we have fewer observations for this variable.]  
33 Note that when Arteta’s definition is used, many data points are lost.   Nevertheless, the coefficient on trade 
openness appears to increase a lot when the sample is restricted using Arteta’s dollarization data.    14 
in  Tables  1  shows  that  results  are  robust  to  the  exclusion  of  any  of  the  proxies  for 
dollarization from the regressions (as long as some of the other controls remain in place).
34 
Finally, the coefficient that controls for the size of the transfer in the aftermath of 
the sudden stop -- CA / GDP -- is negative and statistically significant across all variants.  
The implication is as conjectured:  a sudden stop is more likely when a larger resource 
transfer is expected in its aftermath (i.e., when the initial CA deficit is high).  
As for the other controls: the coefficient on short term debt to total debt appears as 
small and positive, but (weakly) statistically significant only in one of the variants of (1). 
This suggests that the term structure of the debt appears not to have a significant effect on 
the probability of a sudden stop. The coefficient on the index of rigidity of the nominal 
exchange rate is positive but statistically insignificant in the regressions. The rest of the 
controls, including institutional quality proxies, never appear as statistically significant and 
all  the  results  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  these  variables  from  the 
regressions. Regional dummies (not reported) are always insignificant.  
Now we come to what we hope is our contribution to the state of the art.  Table 2 
presents instrumental variable estimates for probit. 
35 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The results are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 1, although the point 
estimates of the coefficient on trade openness are quantitatively different.  Interestingly, 
when  we  use  gravity  estimates  as  instrumental  variables  for  trade  openness,  the  point 
estimates  are  noticeably  bigger  in  absolute  value.  This  means  that  correcting  for  the 
                                                 
34 In our preferred model, liability dollarization is part of the story whereby trade openness can be expected to 
have an effect on the probability of a sudden stop.  The fact that the coefficient on trade openness remains 
statistically significant even after excluding liability dollarization from the regressions, however, may mean 
that it works through one of the other channels discussed in the introduction.   Or it may be due to the fact that 
some of the other controls (in particular, foreign debt/GDP) also capture liability dollarization if most foreign 
debt is denominated in foreign currencies as it is usually the case in crisis prone countries. Without any 
additional control, trade openness does not appear as statistically significant in the non-IV regressions, in spite 
of the fact that the controls themselves are rarely significant.  
35 The STATA module used to run these regressions is due to Gelbach (1999) and it implements the method 
of  Whitney  Newey,  “Efficient  Estimation  of  Limited  Dependent  Variable  Models  with  Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables”, Journal of Econometrics (1987).   15 
potential sources of endogeneity, the effect of trade openness on the probability of sudden 
stop is even stronger than what one would be led to conclude from the OLS regressions.  
From the point estimates of the coefficient on trade openness we can estimate the 
average change in the probability of an event occurring as the result of a unit change in the 
value of trade openness.
36 This number is approximately -0.077,
37 meaning that an increase 
in trade openness of 10 percentage points decreases the likelihood of a sudden stop by 
approximately 32%.
38   That is, a country that only trades 20% of GDP (i.e. Argentina) is, 
ceteris paribus, 32% more likely to be hit by a sudden stop than a country that trades 30% 
of GDP (i.e. Australia). 
The rest of the point estimates are qualitatively similar to those found in Table 1. 
Two  differences  are  notable.  (i)  The  estimated  coefficient  on  trade  openness  remains 
strongly negative and statistically significant even when the variable “Foreign Debt / GDP” 
is excluded from the regressions. (ii) The coefficient on “Liability Dollarization” appears 
positive and statistically significant when the variable “Short Term Debt / Total Debt” is 
excluded from the regressions. In spite of these results, it is worth reemphasizing that the 
methodology  here  only  promises  the  exogeneity  of  trade  openness,  so  no  causal 
relationship can be derived from the other estimates. 
Next, we redo the exercise using the Frankel-Rose and Frankel-Wei definition of 
crises as the dependent variable. In Table 3 we report standard probit results, and in Table 4 
we present IV probit results with gravity estimates as the instrumental variable for trade. 
The results are consistent with those reported before.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
                                                 
36 Note that in a linear regression model the slope coefficient of a regressor measures the effect on the average 
value of the regressand for a unit change in the value of the regressor. In probit the rate of change in the 
probability is somewhat complicated and given by ￿j*Ø(Zi), where ￿j is the coefficient of the jth regressor and 
Ø(.) is the density function of the standard normal variable where Zi = ￿X, that is, the regression model used 
in the analysis.  
37 This average is based on reported and not reported regressions. 
38 A 10 percentage point increase in the independent variable “trade openness” is, for example, an increase 
from the mean value of this variable in the sample, which is 0.63, to 0.73 (see appendix A.3. for summary 
statistics); or, equivalently, an increase in trade openness of approximately two standard deviations above the 
sample  mean.  Given  the  estimated  coefficient  on  trade  openness,  this  0.10  increase  in  the  independent 
variable decreases the left hand side by: 0.10*(-0.077) = -0.0077. The left hand-side variable is either “0’s” or 
“1’s”. Because 2.39% of the observations in the sample are 1’s, a -0.0077 change in the left hand side variable   16 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The main highlights are: 
·  Openness reduces the probability of a currency crisis. The point estimates are 
not as large in absolute value as those obtained when using “SS1;” but the new 
coefficients are always statistically significant at standard confidence levels and 
the  instrumental  variables  results  are  still  stronger  than  the  standard  probit 
results. This reinforces the point already made, that correcting for the potential 
sources of endogeneity, the effect of trade openness on the probability of an 
external crisis is even stronger than what one would be led to conclude from the 
OLS regressions that use the trade to GDP ratio as a measure of openness.  
·  The coefficient on “Foreign Debt / GDP” is positive and statistically significant 
in most of the IV probit regressions, suggesting that the presence of a large 
stock of foreign debt as a percentage of GDP increases the probability of crisis. 
The result is not robust in the standard probit regressions and is idiosyncratic to 
this particular definition of crisis episodes. 
·  The coefficient on the log of Reserves, in months of imports, is systematically 
negative  and  statistically  significant  across  both,  standard  and  IV  probit 
regressions. This suggests that having a large stockpile of reserves reduces the 
probability of being hit by a crisis. This result is interesting because this variable 
is  always  insignificant  in  the  regressions  that  use  “SS1”  as  the  dependent 
variable. The most likely reason for the difference is the way in which crises are 
defined in both cases. Frankel-Rose definition of crisis episodes uses the foreign 
exchange market pressure index which itself includes change in Reserves in the 
definition, while “SS1” does not. 
·  The coefficient on “ierr” is positive and statistically significant across most of 
the regressions in both  tables. This suggests that having a peg increases the 
chances of being hit by a crisis. This result is also idiosyncratic to this definition 
of crisis episodes. 
                                                                                                                                                     
means that there is a decrease in the probability of observing a 1 instead of a 0 (i.e. observing a sudden stop) 
of approximately (-0.0077/0.0239)*100=-32%   17 
·  The  coefficient  on  “CA  /  GDP”  is  systematically  insignificant  across  all 
regressions. This is also different from the case in which the dependent variable 
is  “SS1”.  Once  again  the  most  likely  reason  is  the  definition  of  the  crisis 
variable itself. Recall that “SS1” is built upon the assumption that there is an 
outstanding  current  account  deficit  that  has  to  be  abruptly  reduced  in  the 
presence of a crisis; while in the alternative definition of crises, an episode can 
occur independently of what happens to the current account if the government is 
willing to give up reserves to finance an outstanding deficit. 
·  All of the aforementioned results are even stronger in statistical significance 
when regional dummies are excluded from the regressions.  
The rest of the controls never appear as statistically significant, but all the results 
are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of these variables from the regressions. Regional 
dummies (not reported) are always insignificant. We find it reassuring that we get very 
similar results using two very different definitions of crises. We also get some additional 
results in terms of other variables that increase or reduce the probability of a crisis, but we 
choose not to emphasize these so strongly because the methodology we propose here only 
promises the exogeneity of openness.  
 
IV. Robustness Checks 
Finally, we perform a variety of robustness checks. We redo all regressions using 
linear  models  rather  than  probit.  All  of  the  aforementioned  results  are  robust  to  this 
alteration. We report these regressions in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix A.5.  In table 7 in the 
same appendix we report results for instrumental variables GLS random effects estimates. 
Reassuringly,  results  are  both  quantitatively  and  qualitative  similar  to  those  in  the 
comparable Table 6.
39  
The next step is to look at an alternative dependent variable, one that combines 
crisis episodes with the depth of the crisis, where the latter is measured in terms of the 
recessionary impact of an event. We choose to use the sum of output lost during crises (and 
                                                 
39 Unfortunately, the STATA module used to compute instrumental variables probit (Table 1) does not allow 
running random effects instrumental variables probit regressions.  So there is no table analogous to Table 5 
but  for  probit  regressions.  Nevertheless,  and  somewhat  reassuringly,  random  effects  non-instrumental 
variables probit models yield almost identical results to those of plain probit (i.e. Table 4).   18 
up to three years after the crisis), excluding from that summation cases where crises were 
associated with output gain. We borrow this variable from Frankel and Wei (2004).
40 Given 
the nature of the dependant variable, which is censored to the left of the distribution at zero, 
the natural candidate for the estimation is a Tobit model. We perform Tobit and iv Tobit 
regressions and report the typical results in the first two columns in Table 8 in Appendix 
A.5.
41 We find that openness tends to dampen the contractionary effects of crises, but the 
effect is not robust in the IV regressions. We also find that the “Foreign Debt / GDP”, the 
“Short Term Debt / Total Debt” and “Liability Dollarization” typically enter regressions 
with a positive coefficient, meaning that the presence of all these increases the recessionary 
effect of crises. Finally, the “Lag of reserves in months of imports” is typically negative 
and statistically significant, meaning that the presence of a large stockpile of reserves tends 
to dampen the recession that might come in the aftermath of an external crisis.  In columns 
3 and 4 of Table 8, we also report IV linear and IV probit results which depict a similar 
picture. The only noticeable difference is that in the IV probit regressions the coefficient on 
openness is typically statistically significant. All the other controls are never statistically 
significant.  
The evidence suggests that openness tends to reduce the contractions that might 
follow crisis episodes, but the results are not as robust as those we obtain using sudden 
stops or currency crises as the dependent variable.  In particular, they are not always strong 
in IV tobit regressions. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In summary, the evidence overall appears to be quite robust. Economies that trade 
less  with  other  countries  are  more  prone  to  sudden  stops  and  to  currency  crashes. 
Controlling  for  other  plausible  determinants  of  these  shocks  and  instrumenting  trade 
openness  by  gravity  estimates  to  avoid  identification  problems,  we  find  a  causal  link 
between lack of openness to trade and the instability of financial flows. In fact  out of the  
set of controls we tried, only trade openness and the size of current account deficit before 
                                                 
40 Summary statistics are in Appendix A.3. 
41 The STATA module used to run these regressions is due to Gelbach (1999b) and it implements the method 
of  Whitney  Newey,  “Efficient  Estimation  of  Limited  Dependent  Variable  Models  with  Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables”, Journal of Econometrics (1987).   19 
the shock appear as significant predictors of sudden stops. Trade openness, foreign debt, 
reserves and the nominal exchange rate rigidity also appear as significant predictors of the 
other form of external crises analyzed.  
The effect of trade openness on the probability of sudden stop appears to be not 
only qualitatively robust, but also quantitatively significant. A conservative estimate (based 
on the average point estimate of the reported and unreported coefficients on trade openness) 
yields the surprising result that, all else equal, increasing the trade to GDP ratio by 10 
percentage points (i.e. going from Argentina’s current trade share to Australia’s average 
trade share) reduces the probability of a sudden stop by approximately 32%.  We also find 
some evidence that more openness reduces the output cost associated with crises, although 
these results are not as robust as those that point to the connection between openness and 
the probability of crises.    20 
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Figure 2: Crises Episodes based on “foreign exchange market pressure index”  
[Frankel and Wei (2004)] 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations 
Crisis Episodes 
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Table 1: Non - Instrumental variables Probit Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
Trade openness t 
-0.53   
(0.259)** 
-0.86   
(0.343)** 
-3.01   
(0.998)** 
-1.025   
(0.671) 
-0.898    
(0.348)** 
-0.691   
(0.329)** 
-0.705   
(0.278)** 
-0.831   
(0.344)** 




-0.080    
(0.217) 
-0.07    
(0.243) 
-0.860   
(0.685) 
-0.995   
(0.453)** 
-0.028   
(0.238) 
-0.144   
(0.243) 
-0.063   
(0.236) 
-0.087   
(0.235)   
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 
  0.951   
(0.855) 




1.168   
(0.765)    0.553    
(0.686) 
0.9776   
(0.772) 
0.358    
(0.601) 
Liability 




0.236   
(0.266)    0.599    
(0.229)**    0.399   
(0.216)** 
0.244   
(0.242) 
0.324   
(0.268) 
0.302   
0.2455 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
    0.733   
(1.416)             
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
      0.224   
(0.146)           
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 
-4.068   
(1.297)** 
-5.417   
(1.902)** 
-9.69   
(2.86)*** 
-8.68   
(2.928)** 
-5.60   
(1.888)** 
-4.98   
(1.781)** 
-4.99   
(1.632)** 
-5.50   
(1.862)** 
-3.42   
(1.308)** 
FDI/GDP t-1        -0.0974   
(0.074)           
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
      -0.121   
(0.1165)           
Ln GDP  
per capita t-1 
  0.035   




-0.101   
(0.136) 
0.106   
(0.134)    0.175  
(0.152) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.141   
(0.268)    0.4143   
(0.359) 
0.170   
(0.269) 
-0.059   
(0.245)    0.137   
(0.201) 
0.065   
(0.187) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES   
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES   
Constant  -2.544   
(0.63)*** 
-2.065   
(1.383) 
-0.244   
(1.099) 
-1.99   
(1.73) 
-2.165     
(1.372) 
-1.255   
(1.064) 






Obs.  778  464  113  296  447  597  564  508  904 
R
2  0.0992  0.1154  0.2927  0.2033  0.1115  0.1178  0.1037  0.1156  0.0872 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10%   27 
Table 2: Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions  
 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
Trade openness t 
-2.45 
(0.813)** 
-3.47   
(1.419)** 
-5.20   
(2.40)** 
-3.99   
(2.12)* 
-3.31   
(1.286)** 
-3.02   
(1.167)** 
-2.78   
(0.931)** 
-3.17   
(1.260)** 






0.687   
(0.512) 
0.637   
(0.955) 
-0.475   
(0.813) 
0.662   
(0.465) 
0.356    
(0.380) 
0.500   
(0.358) 
0.533   
(0.440)   
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 
  1.51   
(1.226) 
1.89   
(1.779) 
2.735   
(2.22) 
1.78   
(1.11)    1.01   
(1.01) 
1.83   
(0.984)* 
0.199   
(0.763) 
Liability 




0.094   
(0.328)    0.638   
(0.448)    0.681   
(0.291)** 
0.127   
(0.299) 
0.236   
(0.314) 
0.251   
(0.231) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
    -2.126   
(1.416)             
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
      0.328   
(0.146)**           
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 
-7.386   
(2.06)*** 
-8.39   
(2.50)*** 
-7.674   
(3.755)** 
-16.83   
(4.58)*** 
-8.4   
(2.433)*** 
-8.186   
(2.36)*** 
-7.57   
(2.18)*** 
-8.049   
(2.41)*** 
-4.67   
(1.543)** 
FDI/GDP t-1        -0.047   
(0.1572)           
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
      -0.171   
(0.231)           
Ln GDP  
per capita t-1 
  0.235   
(0.263)    -0.167   
(0.353) 
0.20   
(0.247) 
-0.039   
(0.164) 
0.396   
(0.223)*    0.252   
(0.159) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.188   
(0.287)    0.636   
(0.418) 
0.192   
(0.276) 
-0.293   
(0.247)    0.314   
(0.255) 
0.160   
(0.192) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant  -1.73   
(0.723)** 
-2.443   
(1.452)* 
5.88   
(3.557) 




-0.132   
(1.163) 
-3.697   
(1.501)** 
-1.086   
(1.010) 
-3.04   
(1.067)** 
Obs.  1062  724  262  514  767  934  821  751  1217 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10%   28 
Table 3: Non-Instrumental variable Probit Regressions  
 
  Dependent Variable: Crisis Episodes [Frankel and Wei (2004) definition of exchange market pressure] 
Trade openness t 
-0.57   
(0.269)** 
-0.64   
(0.249)** 
-0.46   
0.554 
-0.59   
(0.307)** 
-0.64   
(0.262)** 
-0.58   
(0.281)** 
-0.37   
(0.208)* 
-0.32   
(0.129)** 




0.23   
(0.231) 
0.21   
(0.196) 






0.27   
(0.218) 
0.35   
(0.176)**    0.24   
(0.233) 
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 
  0.39   
(0.694)      0.30   
(0.711)        0.83   
(0.877) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(1) 
0.027   
(0.249) 
0.062   
(0.224)    0.024    
(0.288)      0.044   
(0.205) 
-0.0003   
(0.148)   
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
    -1.0    
1.76             
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
0.13   
(0.094)      0.18   
(0.098)** 
0.15   
(0.090)* 
0.14   




-0.272   
(1.392) 
0.004   
(1.406)    -0.95   
(1.54)          0.55   
(1.381) 
FDI/GDP t-1        0.03   
(0.058)          0.03   
(0.032) 
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
-0.26   
(0.082)*** 
-0.30   
(0.079)** 
-0.35   
(0.3851) 
-0.19   
(0.087)** 
-0.22   
(0.069)*** 
-0.25  
(0.077)***    -0.21  
(0.036)*** 
-0.29   
(0.083)*** 
Ln GDP 
per capita t-1 
          0.009   
(0.1114)      -0.058  
(0.139) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.09   
(0.152)      0.17    
(0.153) 
0.25   
(0.158)      0.25   
(0.172) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 




0.565   
(1.041) 
-0.581   
(1.085) 
-0.486   
(0.568) 
-0.531   
(1.069)** 
-1.447   
(0.61)** 
-0.599   
(0.498) 
-0.461   
(0.958) 
Obs.  557  690  119  481  622  586  798  1841  561 
R
2  0.1186  0.1252  0.2113  0.1201  0.1253  0.1211  0.0894  0.0857  0.1238 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10%   29 
Table 4: Probit Instrumental Variables Regressions  
 
  Dependent Variable: Crisis Episodes [Frankel and Wei (2004) definition of exchange market pressure] 
Trade openness t 
-1.73   
(0.918)* 
-1.62   
(0.747)** 
-2.53      
(2.518) 
-1.95   
(1.045)* 
-1.53   
(0.765)** 
-1.77   
(0.946)* 










0.49   
(0.274)* 
-0.17   
(0.786) 
0.756   
(0.422)* 
0.653   
(0.334)* 
0.616   
(0.35)* 
0.571   
(0.227)**    0.75   
(0.416)* 
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 
  0.39   
(0.672)      0.32   
(0.677)        0.75   
(0.914) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(1) 
0.18   
(0.234) 
0.05   
(0.217)    0.21   
(0.274)      -0.11   
(0.181) 
0.001   
(0.143) 
0.015   
(0.290) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
    -1.42   
(2.679)             
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
0.22   
(0.113)*      0.26   
(0.116)** 
0.19   
(0.099)** 
0.26  




0.66   
(1.455) 
0.91   
(1.37)    0.34    
(1.677)          0.21    
(1.72) 
FDI/GDP t-1        0.13   
(0.098)          0.13   
(0.088) 
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
-0.37   
(0.099)*** 
-0.39   
(0.089)*** 
-0.83   
(0.619) 
-0.30   
(0.11)** 
-0.26   
(0.078)*** 
-0.37   
(0.110)***    -0.29  
(0.0436)** 
-0.30   
(0.106)** 
Ln GDP 
per capita t-1 
          0.04  
(0.104)       
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.13   
(0.161)      0.196   
(0.159) 
0.27   
(0.165)      0.35   
(0.203) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant  0.304   
(0.786) 
-0.392   
(0.089) 
2.82   
(2.667) 
0.472   
(0.982) 
0.139   
(0.764) 
-1.364   
(0.89) 




-0.147   
(1.10) 
Obs.  841  841  331  738  737  1038  1196  2375  580 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10% 
   30 
VII. Appendixes 
 
A.1 Sudden Stops 
 
I use four alternative definitions of sudden stops: my preferred definition “SS1”, and three 
alternative  “SS2”,  “SS3”  and  “SS4”.  “SS2”  and  “SS3”  are  conceptually  equivalent  to 
“SS1”,  but  are  more  restrictive  in  that  they  capture  fewer  episodes.  “SS4”  is,  instead, 
equivalent to “SS1” but is less restrictive in that classifies as sudden stops events that don’t 
necessarily trigger recessions. 
 
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 1” (SS1): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70´s, 80´s, 90’s+) 
in the sample and then compute the mean standard deviation for by averaging the 
results obtained for each decade. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter  to  keep  observations  (country/year)  that  show  reductions  in  the  financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the mean standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations that don’t pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP 
per  capita  in  that  country  during  the  same  year  or  the  year  immediately  after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit  in  that  country  during  the  same  year  or  the  year  immediately  after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as 
either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, 
or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
9)  Results:  
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
86  3510  1651   31 
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 2” (SS2): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70´s, 80´s, 90’s+) 
in the sample. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter  to  keep  observations  (country/year)  that  show  reductions  in  the  financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the corresponding decade standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations 
that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP 
per  capita  in  that  country  during  the  same  year  or  the  year  immediately  after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit  in  that  country  during  the  same  year  or  the  year  immediately  after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as 
either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, 
or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
9)  Results:  
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
68  3531  1648   32 
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 3” (SS3): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
3)  Compute the standard deviation the year to year changes for each decade (70´s, 
80´s, 90’s+) in the sample and then compute the mean standard deviation for by 
averaging the results obtained for each decade 
4)  Filter  to  keep  observations  (country/year)  that  show  reductions  in  the  financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the mean standard deviation computed in step (3). Observations that don’t pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP 
per  capita  in  that  country  during  the  same  year  or  the  year  immediately  after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit  in  that  country  during  the  same  year  or  the  year  immediately  after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as 
either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, 
or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
9)  Results:  
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
48  3551  1648   33 
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 4” (SS4): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70´s, 80´s, 90’s+) 
in the sample and then compute the mean standard deviation for by averaging the 
results obtained for each decade. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter  to  keep  observations  (country/year)  that  show  reductions  in  the  financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the mean standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations that don’t pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit  in  that  country  during  the  same  year  or  the  year  immediately  after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
7)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as 
either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, 
or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
8)  Results:  
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
  “1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
145  3450  1652   34 
Table A.1: Sudden Stops 1 
Country  Number of 
Episodes         
Afghanistan, I.S. of  0         
Albania  0         
Algeria  1  1990       
Angola  0         
Antigua and Barbuda  0         
Argentina  1  2001       
Aruba  0         
Australia  0         
Austria  0         
Bahamas, The  0         
Bahrain, Kingdom of  0         
Bangladesh  0         
Barbados  1  1982       
Belgium  0         
Belgium-Luxembourg  0         
Belize  0         
Benin  1  1983       
Bolivia  1  1982       
Bosnia & Herzegovina  0         
Botswana  0         
Brazil  0         
Bulgaria  0         
Burkina Faso  1  1989       
Burundi  0         
Cambodia  0         
Cameroon  2  1988  1990     
Canada  1  1982       
Cape Verde  1  1990       
Central African Rep.  1  1988       
Chad  0         
Chile  3  1982  1983  1998   
China,P.R.: Mainland  0         
China,P.R.:Hong Kong  0         
Colombia  2  1998  1999     
Comoros  1  1988       
Congo, Republic of  2  1984  1996     
Costa Rica  2  1981  1996     
Côte d'Ivoire  0         
Croatia  0         
Cyprus  0         
Czech Republic  0         
Czechoslovakia  0         
Denmark  0         
Djibouti  0         
Dominica  1  2001         35 
Dominican Republic  0         
Ecuador  2  1983  1999     
Egypt  1  1990       
El Salvador  1  1979       
Equatorial Guinea  0         
Ethiopia  2  1982  1991     
Fiji  1  1999       
Finland  1  1991       
France  0         
Gabon  0         
Gambia, The  1  1982       
Germany  1  2001       
Ghana  0         
Greece  0         
Grenada  0         
Guatemala  0         
Guinea  0         
Guinea-Bissau  1  1986       
Guyana  0         
Haiti  0         
Honduras  0         
Hungary  0         
Iceland  1  2001       
India  0         
Indonesia  1  1997       
Iran, I.R. of  0         
Iraq  0         
Ireland  0         
Israel  2  1988  1998     
Italy  0         
Jamaica  0         
Japan  0         
Jordan  2  1992  1993     
Kenya  0         
Kiribati  0         
Korea  1  1997       
Kuwait  0         
Kyrgyz Republic  0         
Lao People's Dem.Rep  0         
Lesotho  0         
Liberia  0         
Libya  0         
Macedonia, FYR  0         
Madagascar  0         
Malawi  1  1981       
Malaysia  1  1997       
Maldives  0         
Mali  0         
Malta  1  2000         36 
Mauritania  0         
Mauritius  0         
Mexico  3  1982  1994  1995   
Mongolia  2  1990  1991     
Montserrat  0         
Morocco  1  1995       
Mozambique  0         
Myanmar  0         
Namibia  0         
Nepal  0         
Netherlands  1  1981       
Netherlands Antilles  0         
New Zealand  2  1988  1998     
Nicaragua  1  1986       
Niger  0         
Nigeria  1  1999       
Norway  0         
Oman  2  1987  1999     
Pakistan  0         
Panama  1  2000       
Papua New Guinea  0         
Paraguay  1  2002       
Peru  1  1998       
Philippines  2  1997  1998     
Poland  0         
Portugal  1  1992       
Romania  0         
Rwanda  1  1994       
Samoa  0         
São Tomé & Príncipe  0         
Saudi Arabia  0         
Senegal  0         
Seychelles  1  2000       
Sierra Leone  0         
Singapore  0         
Slovak Republic  0         
Slovenia  0         
Solomon Islands  1  1998       
Somalia  0         
South Africa  0         
Spain  1  1992       
Sri Lanka  1  2001       
St. Kitts and Nevis  0         
St. Lucia  1  2001       
St. Vincent & Grens.  1  2000       
Sudan  0         
Suriname  1  1992       
Swaziland  1  1999       
Sweden  1  1991         37 
Switzerland  0         
Syrian Arab Republic  1  1989       
Tanzania  0         
Thailand  1  1997       
Togo  0         
Tonga  1  1989       
Trinidad and Tobago  1  1984       
Tunisia  0         
Turkey  4  1991  1994  1998  2001 
Uganda  0         
United Kingdom  0         
United States  0         
Uruguay  1  2002       
Vanuatu  1  1991       
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1  1994       
Vietnam  0         
Yemen, Republic of  1  1994       
Zambia  1  1990       
Zimbabwe  1  1983       
   38 
A.2. Gravity Estimates 
 
To compute the gravity estimates we use Frankel and Rose (2002) dataset. It consists of 
41,678 bilateral trade observations spanning six different years (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 
1990,  and  1995).  All  186  countries,  dependencies,  territories,  overseas  departments, 
colonies, and so forth for which the United Nations Statistical Office collects international 
trade data are included in the data set. The trade data are taken from the World Trade 
Database, a consistent recompilation of the U.N. trade data presented in Feenstra, Lipsey, 
and  Bowen  (1997),  augmented  with  data  from  U.N.’s  International  Trade  Statistics 
Yearbook. This data set is estimated to cover at least 98% of all trade. 
For each of the six different years for which I have data I compute OLS regressions of the 
following form: 
 
Log (Ti,j / Yi) = c + ￿ logdisti,j + ￿logpop2 + ￿comlangi,j + ￿borderi,j + ￿areapi,j + ￿landlock + 
￿ 
 
Where “Ti,j” is the bilateral trade value between countries “i” and “j”; “Yi” is the real GDP 
of country “i”; “c” is a constant term; “logdisti,j” is the log of the distance between the 
economic centers of countries “i” and “j”; “comlang” is a dummy variable that takes value 
one if “i” and “j” share a common language and is zero otherwise; “border”  is a dummy 
variable that takes value one if “i” and “j” share a border and is zero otherwise; “areapi,j” is 
the log of the product of the areas (in km
2) of countries “i” and “j”; and “landlock” takes 
values two if “i” and “j” are both landlocked,  one if either “i” or “j” are landlocked, and 
zero otherwise; and “￿” is the error term.  
The gravity estimates are generated by taking the exponent of fitted values and summing 
across bilateral partners j. This yields estimates for six different years: 1970, 1975, 1980, 
1985,  1990  and  1995.  The  missing  values  of  the  panel  are  generated  by  taking  the 
observation corresponding to the closest year with data. The correlation between trade ratio 
and generated IV for the entire panel is 0.52.   39 
A.3. Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
    
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
SS1  3596  .0239155  .1528071  0  1 
SS1bis (no contiguous 
crises)  3590  .0222841  .1476266  0  1 
SS2  3599  .0188941  .1361701  0  1 
SS2bis (no contiguous 
crises)  3596  .0180756  .1332436  0  1 
SS3  3599  .013337  .1147293  0  1 
SS3bis (no contiguous 
crises)   3597  .0127884  .1123762  0  1 
SS4  3595  .0403338  .1967683  0  1 
SS4bis (no contiguous 
crises)  3587  .0381935  .1916898  0  1 
Trade openness               (A)  4247  .7322445  .432648  .0153068  2.960163 
Fitted trade openness      (B)  4261  .1487951  .1497813  .0016543  1.364657 
Lagged  
Dollarization  (1)             (C)  3454  .3207969  .3902904  0  1.999936 
Lagged  
Dollarization (2)             (D)  897  .2666019  .2752479  0  1 
Lagged ratio of foreign debt 
to GDP                            (E)  1789  .2780933  .4375788  0  5.844839   40 
Lagged current account 
balance to GDP               (F)  3630  -.038277  .1034782  -2.404958  .58553 
Lagged ratio of foreign debt 
to GDP                            (G)  1791        .2779454      .4373619           0  5.844839 
Lagged index of exchange 
rate rigidity                     (H)  3059  2.411246  .8072297  1  3 
Voice and  
Accountability                  (I)  3255  .3525906  .9023457  -1.623367  1.693636 
Political Stability/Lack of 
Violence                           (I)  3038  .2303492  .8255066  -1.694225  1.69047 
Effectiveness of 
Government                      (I)  3038  .3136892  .8409723  -1.320767  2.082198 
Regulatory Framework    (I)  3224  .3598345  .5851707  -1.500832  1.244778 
Rule of Law                      (I)  3224  .2939932  .871838  -1.203638  1.995832 
Control of Corruption       (I)  3038  .2972141  .9230486  -1.104606  2.129017 
Lag of the log of ratio of 
FDI to GDP                      (J)  3344  -.086772  1.659605  -8.031686  4.978178 
Lag of the log of ratio of 
Reserves in moths of 
imports                            (K) 
3687 
  .8576736  .9757717  -6.114763  3.238615 
Lag of the log of real GDP 
per capita                         (L)  2798  7.777605  1.55145  4.439352  10.8719 
Lag of the ratio of short 
term debt to total debt    (M) 
3429 
  .1240123       .128602           0  .9990642 
Polity 2                            (O)  4102           .4193077      7.567316         -10     10 
Crisis Episodes                (P)  3039               .1378743      .3448247           0  1   41 
Output loss in the aftermath 
of a crisis                         (Q)  3039      .0035077      .0337175           0        1.08 
(A) The negative of the trade to GDP ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(B) See Appendix A.2 for an explanation of the methodology employed and data used. 
(C) The ratio of foreign liabilities of the financial sector to money. Source: IFS (Line 26C/line 34) 
(D) The ratio of “Total Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits. Source: Arteta (2002) and Arteta (2003)  
(E) Source: IFS line 89c 
(F) Ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(G) Ratio over 100. Source: IMF-IFS 
(H) index=1 is (de-facto) flexible exchange rate; index=2 is (de-facto) intermediate arrangement; and index=3 
is (de-facto) peg. Source: Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
(I) Source: Kaufman et. al. (2002) 
(J) Source: WDI-CR ROM 
(K) Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(L) Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(M) Ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD Rom 
(O) Range = -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy). Combined Polity Score: Computed by 
subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC; normal range polity scores are imputed for coded “interregnum" and 
"transition period" special polity conditions, polities coded “interruption" on the POLITY variable are left 
blank. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
(P) Source: Frankel and Wei (2004). The approach in Frankel and Wei (2004) is to use the foreign exchange 
market pressure index. This index is defined as the percentage fall in reserves plus the percentage fall in the 
foreign exchange value of the currency. The idea is that this index  measures the  fall in demand for the 
country’s currency; it is then up to the monetary authorities to determine whether to accommodate, by letting 
the money supply fall, or to depreciate. To avoid treating every year of a multi-year high-inflation period as a 
separate crisis, the approach followed by the authors requires that for an event to be considered a crisis 
episode, the increase in exchange market pressure must represent an acceleration of at least an additional 10 
percent over the preceding period; and they also adopt an exclusion window of 3 years.  
(Q) Source: Frankel and Wei (2004). 
A.4. Summary Statistics tabulated by SS1 





























N  3194  3031  3299  2477  1509  814  2713 
Mean  .7435752  .1391386  -.036689  .1306851  .2696239  .2632213  .343962 
Standard 
Deviation  .4238145  .1338924  .1013581  .1251594  .3695807  .2738159  .4002734 
Max  2.948319  1.364657  .58553  .9896104  5.303783  1  1.999936 
Min  .0153068  .0016543  -2.40495  0  0  0  0 
0 
Median  .641516  .1028203  -.0292687  .0998124  .1625514  .1679155  .1790431 
N  82  82  84  71  44  26  63 
Mean  -.7233081  -.1138573  -.0910636  .1771209  .3061938  .2553588  .4459254 
Standard 
Deviation  .4039229  .1068885  .0922481  .1075558  .3830985  .2475523  .4873929 
Max  -.1859836  -.0016543  .0175044  .5749587  1.843943  .8585674  1.864839 
Min  -2.164437  -.6640582  -.5269149  .0100371  .0120837  .0007974  .0051215 
1 
Median  -.5978948  -.0795055  -.0542901  .1715937  .178018  .2060619  .2751537 
N  3276  3113  3383  2548  1553  840  2776 
Mean  -.7430679  -.1384726  -.0380395  .1319791  .2706601  .2629779  .3462761 
Standard 
Deviation  .4232809  .1332988  .1014827  .1249182  .3698927  .2729095  .4026407 
Max  -.0153068  -.0016543  .58553  .9896104  5.303783  1  1.999936 
Min  -2.948319  -1.364657  -2.404958  0  0  0  0 
Total 






















N  2558  2508  2347  2347  2483  2483  2347 
Mean  2.35731  .3879369  .2489824  .3526585  .3883469  .3380581  .3369313 
Standard 
Deviation  .8247772  .9008189  .8401079  .86721  .5761471  .8931987  .9569204 
Max  3  1.693636  1.69047  2.082198  1.244778  1.995832  2.129017 
Min  1  -1.623367  -1.694225  -1.320767  -1.500832  -1.203638  -1.104606 
0 
Median  3  .4057957  .164349  .1734646  .4442023  .2741438  .020012 
N  66  69  67  67  69  69  67 
Mean  2.333333  .227192  .0607287  .2434398  .4245789  .2118273  .1812266 
Standard 
Deviation  .8289629  .8603037  .80767  .7970953  .4912563  .8233971  .8957398 
Max  3  1.628049  1.514361  2.030241  1.232713  1.824  2.085337 
Min  1  -1.357771  -1.694225  -1.320767  -1.169838  -1.203638  -1.104606 
1 
Median  3  .1533591  .0833327  .1636702  .5331683  .0391075  -.1452185 
N  2624  2577  2414  2414  2552  2552  2414 
Mean  2.356707  .3836329  .2437574  .3496271  .3893265  .3346452  .3326097 
Standard 
Deviation  .8247325  .899972  .839633  .8653738  .5739639  .8914687  .955443 
Max  3  1.693636  1.69047  2.082198  1.244778  1.995832  2.129017 
Min  1  -1.623367  -1.694225  -1.320767  -1.500832  -1.203638  -1.104606 
Total 






































N  2888  2739  3320  2307  3222  3222  3222  3222  3222  3222  3222 
Mean  1.601801  -.060504  .858744  7.844113  .129375  .2071875  .2453125  .106875  .2515625  .04  .0196875 
Standard 
Deviation  7.589532  1.651816  .9538479  1.558114  .335667  .4053544  .4303396  .3090025  .4339789  .1959898  .1389458 
Max  10  4.348825  3.238615  10.8719  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Min  -10  -
7.811624  -6.114763  4.439352  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0 
Median  5  .1566815  .9742805  7.625561  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
N  73  76  82  63  84  84  84  84  84  84  84 
Mean  2.068493  .2983586  .8429953  7.703143  .1585366  .1341463  .3292683  .1463415  .2073171  .0121951  .0121951 
Standard 
Deviation  7.142068  1.764806  .9447249  1.304005  .3674911  .3429068  .4728395  .3556233  .4078793  .1104315  .1104315 
Max  10  3.106559  2.355545  10.21361  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Min  -10  -8.03168  -2.404618  4.608365  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1 
Median  4  .4463752  1.094091  7.794864  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
N  2961  2815  3402  2370  3306  3306  3306  3306  3306  3306  3306 
Mean  1.613306  -.050816  .8583644  7.840365  .1301036  .2053626  .2474101  .1078611  .250457  .0393053  .0195003 
Standard 
Deviation  7.578023  1.655657  .9534944  1.55183  .3364686  .4040279  .4315728  .3102521  .4333423  .19435  .1382963 
Max  10  4.348825  3.238615  10.8719  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Min  -10  -
8.031686  -6.114763  4.439352  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total 
Median  5  .1619896  .9755991  7.632787  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   45 
A.5. Robustness Check Tables 
 
Table 5: Pooled OLS (Linear) Regressions 
 
Robust standard error to clustered heterogeneity reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10% 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
Trade openness t 
-0.024   
(0.013)* 
-0.038   
(0.019)** 
-0.191   
(0.063)** 




-0.030   
(0.0159)* 
-0.033   
(0.0179)* 




















-0.009   
(0.021)   
Short Term Debt/ 







0.1186   
(0.0974) 
0.067 
(0.0515)    0.035  
(0.0523) 





Dollarization  t-1  
(1) 
0.022   
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.030)    0.029    
(0.0346)    0.025   
(0.0189) 
0.025   
(0.0291) 
0.031   
(0.0298) 
0.0312   
(0.0276) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
 (2) 
    -0.059 
(0.0944)             
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
      0.007   
(0.0113)           
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 
-0.22   
(0.072)** 




-0.343   
(0.139)** 
-0.274   
(0.103)** 
-0.235   
(0.088)** 
-0.275   
(0.095)** 
-0.261   
(0.099)** 
-0.170   
(0.065)** 
FDI/GDP t-1        -0.0009   
(0.0019)           
Ln Reserves in 
Months of  
Imports t-1 
      0.0008   
(0.0033)           
Ln GDP  
per capita t-1 
  0.003 
(0.0135) 
0.082   
(0.0444)* 




-0.006    
(0.0086) 
0.005   
(0.0111)    0.010   
(0.0099) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.0046  
(0.0215) 
-0.070     
(0.0401)* 




-0.002   
(0.0182)    0.005   
(0.0179) 
0.003   
(0.0139) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant  -0.0013  
(0.014) 




0.084   
(0.1177) 
0.0007   
(0.1076) 
0.061   
(0.0758) 
-0.0005   
(0.1033) 
0.014   
(0.033) 
-0.081   
(0.0788) 
Obs.  1122  745  219  599  787  961  869  772  1235 
R
2  0.0416  0.0573  0.1903  0.0745  0.0550  0.0500  0.0512  0.0550  0.0373   46 
Table 6: Instrumental Variables Linear Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 







-0.133   
(0.064)** 
-0.100   
(0.03)*** 




-0.088   
(0.03)** 
















0.008   
(0.0222) 
0.004   
(0.0223)   
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 






0.088    




0.025   
(0.0399) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(1) 
0.027   
(0.0169) 
0.016 
(0.0315)    0.028 
(0.0334)    0.029   
(0.0190) 




0.028   
(0.0284) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
    -0.073 
(0.1082)             
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
      0.011 
( 0.0119)           
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 










-0.323   
(0.116)** 
-0.364   
(0.123)** 




FDI/GDP t-1        -0.0003 
(0.0032)           
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
      -0.0014 
(0.0036)           
Ln GDP  
per capita t-1 








-0.004    
(0.0088) 
0.015 
(0.0126)    0.014   
(0.0110) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.007 
(0.0221) 






-0.0061   
(0.0187)    0.011   
(0.0192) 
0.007   
(0.0148) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 














0.092   
(0.0557)* 
-0.063   
(0.0842) 
Obs.  1040  705  215  559  747  914  800  731  1176 
R
2  0.0421  0.0571  0.1923  0.0769  0.0548  0.0508  0.0491  0.0546  0.0337 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10%   47 
Table 7: Instrumental Variables GLS Random-Effects Regressions 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10% 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
Trade openness t 
-0.066  
(0.026)** 
-0.094   
(0.0417)** 








-0.105    
(0.0423)** 








0.007   
(0.0235) 
0.108   
(0.0945) 
0.008   
(0.0235) 
0.012   
(0.0223) 
-0.003   
(0.0188) 
0.012   
(0.0223) 
0.004  
(0.0219)   
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 
  0.071   
(0.0692) 
-0.023   
(0.1807) 
0.063   
(0.0704) 
0.088   
(0.0632)    0.066   
(0.0633) 
0.082   
(0.0647) 
0.025   
(0.0486) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(1) 
0.027   
(0.0149)* 
0.016   
(0.0251)    0.015   
(0.0251)    0.029   
(0.0168)* 
0.014   
(0.0234) 
0.024   
(0.0247) 
0.028   
(0.0192) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
    -0.073    
(0.0875)             
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
      0.011   
(0.013)           
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 
-0.317   
(0.095)*** 
-0.380   
(0.1325)** 
-0.665   
(0.3354)** 
-0.413   
(0.142)** 
-0.395   
(0.129)** 
-0.340   
(0.1085)** 
-0.382   
(0.119)*** 
-0.361   
(0.1275)** 
-0.230    
(0.0888)** 
FDI/GDP t-1        0.0007   
(0.0033)           
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
      0.003     
(0.0030)           
Ln GDP 
per capita t-1 
  0.009   
(0.0148) 
0.086   
(0.0468)* 
0.009   
(0.0148) 
0.011   
(0.0141) 
-0.003   
(0.0094) 
0.0167    
(0.0141)    0.014   
(0.0102) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.007   
(0.0186) 
-0.072   
(0.0417)* 
0.006   
(0.0187) 
0.007   
(0.0172) 
-0.008   
(0.015)    0.011   
(0.0166) 
0.007   
(0.0123) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant  0.024   
(0.0999) 






0.050   
(0.1701) 
0.078   
(0.1274) 
-0.029   
(0.1505) 
0.092   
(0.1440) 
-0.083   
(0.1124) 
Obs.  1040  705  215  705  747  914  800  731  1176 
R
2  0.0435  0.0583  0.1931  0.0576  0.0564  0.0503  0.0499  0.0557  0.0345   48 
Table 8: Output Loss Regressions 
  Non-IV Tobit  IV-Tobit  IV-Linear  IV-Probit 
  Dependent Variable: Output loss in the event of a crisis [Frankel and Wei (2004)] 



























Ln Reserves in 









Short Term Debt/ 






(0.019)   
Regional Dummies?  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Year Fixed-Effects?  NO  NO  YES  YES 








Obs.  750  868  729  1081 
R
2  0.1791  n/a  0.04902  n/a 
     Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
     *** Statistically Significant at 1% 
     ** Statistically Significant at 5% 
     * Statistically Significant at 10% 